Accompanier Perspectives: Ixcán

Since the mid-1990s, members of the NISGUA network have provided a physical international presence to threatened human rights defenders and communities in the Ixcán.

We invite you to read the following reflection piece from one of our current accompaniers, Kayla Myers, about the violence of the past and the ongoing imposition of megadevelopment projects in the area. For more information about accompaniment, please read "The Power of Presence."

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The river Chixoy, which runs from the south of Guatemala all the way up into Mexico, is the life that runs through both the geography of the region and the continued struggles that define our work there. The Cobán-Ixcán region is in the extreme north of Guatemala next to the Mexican border. Cobán is the municipality located on the East side of the river Chixoy. Uspantán. On the West side of the river and in the extreme Northern region is the Ixcán, which is where we will also be working. Surrounding these municipalities are many smaller communities connected often only by foot-trails through the jungle, pickups and small buses, or boats along the Chixoy. 

Many communities in this region were victimized by the Guatemalan military during the armed conflict. For example, in 1982, a pueblo in the north of the Ixcán suffered the largest massacre in the history of Guatemala. On March 14th of that year the army arrived in this pueblo corralling the people into the town marketplace with gunfire, and on the 15th the army burned the Evangelical Church with people trapped inside. On that day, 324 Guatemalans were mass murdered. This history is not a forgotten page, this particular massacre only occurred 33 years ago, and its repercussions still echo into the present and future of this region.

Burial of massacre victims in the Ixcán region, 1996.
Photo credit: S. José Rio Negro, © A. Huet,
Center for Independent Media 

The reason given for the massacre was that the towns-people "supported the guerrilla movement." This was often the reason given during the time of internal armed conflict, a reason masking genocidal and economic motives. It was considered a genocide as Mayan villages were targeted and 84% of those killed or disappeared during the conflict were Indigenous Mayan Peoples. Economic motives are seen in the fact that the government planned the Xalalá hydroelectric project, a dam that will stop the Chixoy river and be used to generate electricity, in the 1970's. Their plan was inhibited, in party, by the presence of communities along the river. The project was paused during the time of massacres and re-vamped in 2004 as a top national priority. After the conflict, the survivors in Cobán-Ixcán were vulnerable from the loss of family, community and land and this vulnerability is now being exploited to gain access to their land and the Chixoy River for the benefit of multi-national companies and the elite class of Guatemala.

Yet, hydroelectric projects do mean clean energy and development in a place isolated and beneath the shadow of extreme poverty. Several questions arise:

"Question:" Why don't they want clean energy and development?
"Response:" If the Xalalá dam is built, over 50 communities around the Chixoy River will be either flooded or completely deprived access to water.

"Q:" What about relocation and compensation?
"R:" The Xalalá dam would be the second largest project in Guatemala next to the Chixoy hydroelectric project built in the 1980s. Those forcibly evicted from their homes and land at that time are still awaiting compensation.

"Q:" What about the trickle down affect of development projects, won't they benefit in the long run?
"R:" The Xalalá project will create energy to be exported, not to be used locally. Those who benefit will be the elite who partner with international companies.

These questions are usually the first to arrive in the minds of people from the Global North, but the implications of damming this river go far deeper than questions of logistics and money.

The Indigenous Mayan peoples are the majority of the population in Guatemala with a culture and tradition alive as the river. The languages spoken in Cobán-Ixcán are principally Q’eqchi, Quiche’, Mam, and Spanish. The Mayan Cosmovision, or view of the world, emphasizes real connection to the Earth and the resources that are life for the Mayan peoples. The river is life, a life under threat.

Indigenous Communities say NO to the Xalalá Hydroelectric
project. Photo credit: NISGUA

There has been no justice for the communities that survived massacres in this region during the armed conflict, instead there is continued tension and re-traumatization. This does not mean that they have given up, on the contrary, the tide for justice in Cobán-Ixcán flows strong. As an example, here is a time-line of their struggle against the Xalalá hydroelectric project:

• 2007 and 2010 – good-faith community consultations are held in Ixcán and Uspantán respectively. Over 18,000 community members, 90% of the population in the region, said NO to the project in these organized votes.

• 2008 - the community consultations, which are legal under International Laws of which Guatemala is a signatory, were ignored by the government and INDE started the project and began looking for investors.

• 2008-2013 – the Xalalá hydroelectric project is stalled by lack of investors due in part to the awareness raised by communities.

• November 2013 - a contract was signed by the Brazilian Company Intertechne Consultores SA to carry out the feasibility studies necessary for dam construction.

• April 2014 - the communities filed a injunction against contract in the Constitutional Court of Guatemala for illegality and irregularities.

• December 2014 – the National Electrification Institute (INDE) cancels the contract with Intertechne and declares that Xalalá is no longer a top national priority. The Constitutional Court has yet to give their decision on the legality of the contract and the people are suspicious of INDE's change in tactics.

INDE has been using any tactic available to weaken the resistance of the local peoples to the project. They attempt to buy out local leaders, seize land in any way they can, start community strife to divide peoples, and offer much needed resources only in return for support of the project. They are even suspected of flying helicopters over these post-conflict communities to scare them into submission.

That is a part of the complex history of this region of Guatemala, so how does that translate to our work? As international human rights accompaniers in this region, my partner and I will provide moral support and a dissuasive presence to the communities and individuals who survived massacres as well as support individuals and organizations struggling against the Xalalá hydroelectric project.

Three of several of the organizations we partner with are:

1. AJR- the Association for Justice and Reconciliation- created by Guatemalan survivors and refugees to bring cases from the armed conflict to trial

2. ACODET - the Association of Communities for the Development of the Defense of Land and Natural Resources - communities in the area organized to resist the Xalalá hydroelectric project

3. Puentes de Paz- Bridges of Peace- they work in the region on several community support projects

They say that this region is the region of walking. From community to community we pack along our belongings and our notebooks, ready to listen to the voices of these powerful defenders and survivors, ready to share information globally to break the ugly silence and isolation in which oppression and violence thrive. I am so ready to learn from the undercurrent of strength that has sustained these people in their struggle, a struggle for the preservation of life, land, and water. In a world being drained of our human connection to nature, this is a struggle we all face together. The implications of their work and survival will be felt through Guatemala and through our global struggle for natural resources and human rights.

Thank you for reading this reflection, for taking time on your path to connect with me and with the people of Guatemala. Please check out www.nisgua.org for updates.

In Solidarity,

Kayla Myers

Reflections on the "Rivers for Life: Cultural Resistance to the Xalalá Dam" fall speaking tour

Tour speaker, Víctor Caal Tzuy, shows NISGUA's Rivers for Life solidarity banner to ACODET members from Las Margaritas Copón.

The goals for the 2014 NISGUA speaking tour were much like those which have guided us during our 33 years as a human rights, solidarity organization: amplify Guatemalan voices and experiences, connect grassroots struggles across borders, inspire, educate and strengthen our partners in the US and Guatemala. This year's tour exceeded our expectations, and we have Víctor Caal Tzuy of the Association of Communities for Development, Defense of Territory and Natural Resources (ACODET) and the NISGUA grassroots base on both coasts to thank.

Víctor's message of cultural resistance, community organization and unity reached more than 1,000 people during more than 20 events and interviews. Spanish language radio spots helped our tour reach immigrant communities in Seattle, Portland and the Bay Area. The tour petition gathered nearly 700 signatures demanding respect for indigenous communities’ right to consultation and the cancellation of the Xalalá pre-construction studies.

Víctor Caal Tzuy speaking at the Duwamish Longhouse & Cultural Center

Presentation to NISGUA supporters at the Unitarian Universalist Church of Arlington, VA

Preparing for a radio interview during Indigenous Peoples Day Sunrise Ceremony on Alcatraz Island

Tour events in Seattle, San Francisco and San Jose, CA, opened space for horizontal exchanges between indigenous leaders and local activists working against displacement and in defense of territories. Our final days were spent in Washington D.C., where Víctor had the opportunity to provide decision-makers in the US government, at the Brazilian Embassy and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) with first-hand information about the damages of the proposed dam project.

Especially moving were the opportunities for horizontal exchange between Víctor and similarly affected peoples –including indigenous peoples of the Pacific Northwest and Bay Area activists fighting for self-determination in Palestine, the Phillipines and Richmond, CA. During one such exchange in Seattle, WA, Víctor, a Maya-Q'eqchi' leader and Ken Workman of the Duwamish Tribal Council, found common ground as indigenous people with shared legacies of river stewardship and common experiences of displacement from colonization. “Ken and I have much in common–we both live on the shores of rivers, and we will defend our rivers”, reflected Víctor. Ken, the great-great-great-great grandson of Chief Si'ahl (Seattle) drew connections between past suffering of the Duwamish people and the current situation facing Q'eqchi' communities opposing the Xalalá Dam. “The potential effects on culture and environment that Victor describes are exactly what occurred here in Seattle 100 years ago..."

Indigenous leaders, Víctor Caal Tzuy and Ken Workman

Sharing culture and struggle with New Fire in San Jose, CA

During meetings in Washington, DC, Víctor expressed the concerns shared by the 51 indigenous communities that compose ACODET about the lack of respect for consultation and the intensification of government pressure to accept the project in return for vital social programs. He shared specific instances of attempts to militarize peacefully resisting communities in the name of fighting supposed drug activity in the region.

In a meeting with the IDB, we discussed a 2008 grant that provided technical support to establish the Xalalá Dam as a “pilot project” for future hydroelectric projects, and we encouraged the Bank to refrain from future funding of the dam given ongoing human rights abuses. We also raised concerns about ongoing IDB loans to the Guatemalan government for rural electrification as these funds are being used to condition local electricity projects in Ixcán communities based on their acceptance of the Xalalá Dam.

At each of the tour stops, Víctor explained the significance and importance of international solidarity in their struggle. He encouraged people to come and visit his community, which is located at the confluence of the Chixoy and Copón rivers, precisely where the Xalalá Dam would be built. “I invite you to come and visit our river. You will be welcomed if you come with NISGUA, but not if you come with the companies. One of the reasons our resistance has been successful is international accompaniment. We need your support.”

Horizontal exchange with Bay Area activists fighting for self-determination

Media links:

Interview at KEPX Seattle, WA

"Letters Home: Dawn in the Ixcán" published on The Outsider 

"Los Qéqchi' y los Duwamish"  / "The Q'equchi' and the Duwamish" published on El Salmón

The Q'eqchi' and the Duwamish

This article was originally published in Spanish, online at elsalmon.org

By Alejandro Echeverría
October 13, 2014 

Indigenous leaders Víctor Caal Tzuy and Ken Workman

Ken Workman is a Seattle native who despite his tall stature, has characteristics that evoke his famous 19th century ancestor - the indigenous Chief of Seattle (Si'ahl) - who gave this city, which lies in the state of Washington on the Pacific coast of the northern United States, its name. Standing before a large audience at the Duwamish headquarters  (the indigenous group to which he belongs), he speaks about his people and his struggle while alternating between the languages of Lushootseed and English. Beside him, Víctor Caal Tzuy, a Q’eqchi' representative of Las Margaritas Copón, listens attentively while he readies himself to speak about his own struggle 4,500 kilometers to the south.

Ken speaks about the agreement his tribe made in the 19th century with the American colonists, in which they ceded their territory under imminent invasion and in exchange for money, the rights to inhabit the land, and to hunt and fish on it. They weren't given an indigenous reservation like many other tribes who had the fortune of living in more remote areas unlike the geographically strategic city of Seattle. The Duwamish are not a recognized tribe. Many of them have been displaced, integrated into other tribes and lost their customs and cultural unity. Ken talked about current attempts to revive the Duwamish culture from the oral tradition that remains. “You have come at a good moment,” he says while looking at Víctor. 

“Ma sa sa’ laach’ool?” greets Victor in Q'eqchi' with a smile and a wave, after which he speaks in Spanish about the impacts that the construction of the Xalalá hydroelectric dam would have on surrounding communities in the Quiché and Alta Verapaz. In response to these impacts, they organized the Association of Communities for Development and the Defense of Land and Natural Resources (ACODET) in order to preserve their communities and consequently  their culture. 

The dam's construction would directly affect 13,000 people living in the 50 communities that would be displaced, and indirectly affect another 18,000 people living in an additional 44 communities. If forced to reach an agreement with INDE, they would be displaced and have to integrate into other communities – a scenario that is all-too familiar. It is impossible to ignore the parallels with Ken's history from almost 150 years ago, parallels that were brought to light on the “Rivers for Life” tour organized by the Network in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala (NISGUA).

In Washington, what was once the Duwamish River or Black River is now dry because it was transformed into a channel. In a surprising and sad coincidence, another river of the same name in Guatemala – the Rio Negro (“Black River”) – is in danger of suffering irreparable changes to the ecosystem and to the communities that depend on it. The communities in the area are organized, brave and made up of intelligent people who are concerned about local development -  a concept that is not necessarily aligned with what we in the capital city perceive as “progress,”. And that's good; why not? Self-determination is important. “In my river, the fishing is good and everyone is welcome except those who want to come to flood our communities,” said Victor, ending his presentation with a slide showing a picture of a child holding up a fish almost as tall as him.

While having coffee in the reception area of a local Seattle radio station where Víctor had given an interview, I learned about the local rules they have established for the proper management of hunting, fishing and the use of natural resources. These policies are much more reasonable than anything someone from Guatemala City with their smart phone in hand could find on Google. He talked a lot about the impact on the flora and fauna, and on the environment, the incomplete environmental studies, the fact that it is important to continue to generate electricity for the city – oh, the progress! - the many pros and cons, all of which come from a perspective that is so city-focused, but not at all cosmopolitan. In fact, there is little talk at all about the cultural impact.

Even though I already knew about the issues surrounding Xalalá and the history of the Duwamish separately, I never saw them side by side. It opened my eyes. There are communities in Guatemala, like those surrounding the Chixoy hydroelectric dam, that have gone through the same things as the Duwamish. We are in a unique context here, if we can only learn how to listen and decide to learn from history.

Translation by NISGUA

ACODET denounces attempt to militarize communities opposing Xalalá dam

According to a secret contract signed between Guatemala's National Electrification Institute (INDE) and Brazilian Intertechne Consultores S.A., geological studies necessary to begin construction on the Xalalá dam are to begin in March 2014. Communities organized in defense of territory, who have opposed the dam's construction for years, denounced the arrival of a military and police convoy to the region on February 25. They roundly reject the government's suggestion of drug activity in their communities and question the timing and location of the incursion.

Read the full communiqué from the Association for Development, Defense of Territory and Natural Resources (ACODET) below.

This past Tuesday, February 25, 2014, [Guatemalan radio station] Radio Sonora reported an announcement by the Minister of the Interior stating that he had received a complaint regarding the presence of drug traffickers in the community of Xalalá, in the municipality of Ixcán. He stated that Mr. Enrique Cajbón had filed the complaint. Radio Sonora began circulating this information before noon.

Around 5 PM the same day, a convoy made up of one truck and four army pick-ups, together with two National Civilian Police (PNC) vehicles, arrived at the crossing near the Copón River bridge, near communities threatened by the construction of the Xalalá dam.

Our community authorities approached those in charge of the army and police contingent to ask for an explanation of their presence in our territory. They responded that they had received a citizen complaint denouncing a supposed shipment of drugs destined for the community of Xalalá. After Mr. Enrique Cajbón presented himself to the authorities, the police admitted that Mr. Cajbón was not the person who filed the complaint and they promised to present a copy of the complaint to our community authorities the next day. After signing an agreement of clarification with our community authorities, the army and police returned to Playa Grande, Ixcán. The next day, local authorities went to the National Police station in Ixcán, but were not provided a copy of the complaint. As a result of our authorities’ instance that they be given a copy of the complaint, the agent, who the day before had promised to produce the document, warned that helicopters might land in our communities in the coming days.

It is relevant to mention that last November the Guatemalan National Electrification Institute (INDE) signed a contract with Brazilian company, Intertechne Consultores S.A., to complete feasibility assessments for the Xalalá dam. The geological feasibility studies are scheduled to be carried out in March 2014 in the communities that make up our territory. The community of Xalalá, in the municipality of Ixcán, is the precise location that INDE used at the beginning of the 80s to carry out the first geological studies on the Xalalá hydroelectric project.

In light of these events, we, the Maya Q’eqchi’ communities threatened by the construction of the Xalalá dam, organized in the association ACODET express:

1. In our communities we all know one another. We use our lands to produce our food, we do not know of, nor do we accept, the presence of organized crime groups or use of our territory by such groups.
2. No clandestine landing strip exists in Xalalá. There is a green space in the center of the community that was previously used as a landing strip but is currently used as a football field and communal space for grazing our domesticated animals. It is not equipped for small plane landings.
3. Mr. Enrique Cajbón, a Maya Q’eqchi’ member of the ancestral indigenous authority of the community of Xalalá, never filed the alleged complaint. No other members of our local authorities were informed of such a complaint, nor was the army’s protection requested.
4. We find it very strange that the Ministry of the Interior published via the radio, and with anticipation, plans for an operative supposedly intended to capture drug traffickers.
5. Based on these events, we believe that the government is trying to frighten our communities, delegitimize our resistance to the imposition of the Xalalá dam and justify a military presence in our territory.
6. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples states: “Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples, unless justified by a relevant public interest or otherwise freely agreed with or requested by the indigenous peoples concerned. States shall undertake effective consultations with the indigenous peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, prior to using their lands or territories for military activities.” (Article 30)

Association for Development, Defense of Territory and Natural Resources

ACODET

Playa Grande, Ixcán February 28, 2014

ACODET denuncia un intento de militarizar las comunidades que resisten la construcción de la represa Xalalá

Según el contrato firmado secretamente entre el Instituto Nacional de Electrificación (INDE) y la empresa brasileña Intertechne Consultores S.A., los estudios de factibilidad para la represa Xalalá debería comenzar en marzo de 2014. Las comunidades organizadas en defensa de su territorio, que por muchos años han luchado en contra de la construcción de la represa, denunciaron la llegada del ejercito y la Policía Nacional Civil en la región el 25 de febrero. Las comunidades rechazan por completo la acusación del gobierno de actividad narcotraficante en sus territorios.

A continuación, compartimos el comunicado entero de la Asociación de Comunidades para el Desarrollo y Defensa del Territorio (ACODET).

El pasado martes 25 de febrero de 2014, la Radio Sonora difundió notas donde el Ministerio de Gobernación, anunciaba haber recibido denuncia sobre la presencia de narcotraficantes en la comunidad Xalalá, municipio de Ixcán, atribuyendo la denuncia al señor Enrique Cajbón. Estos avisos se empezaron a transmitir desde antes del mediodía. 

Alrededor de las cinco de la tarde de ese mismo día un convoy integrado por un camión y cuatro pickup del ejército y dos vehículos de la PNC, llegaron al cruce cercano al puente del río Copón, en área de comunidades amenazadas por la construcción de la represa Xalalá. 

Las autoridades de nuestras comunidades se dirigieron a los encargados del contingente militar y policía para preguntarles sobre el motivo de su presencia en nuestro territorio, a lo que ellos respondieron que habían recibido una denuncia ciudadana sobre un supuesto desembarco de droga en la comunidad Xalalá. Al presentarse el señor Enrique Cajbón, ante los policías reconocieron que él no es el denunciante y se comprometieron a entregar al día siguiente copia de la denuncia a nuestras autoridades comunitarias. Después de firmar un acta de aclaratoria junto a nuestras autoridades comunitarias, el ejército y policías regresaron a Playa Grande, Ixcán. Al día siguiente nuestras autoridades comunitarias se presentaron en la subestación de la PNC en Ixcán, pero no les entregaron copia de la denuncia. Ante la insistencia de nuestras autoridades para que le proporcionen la copia el agente que se comprometió el día anterior les advirtió que en próximos días podrían aterrizar helicópteros en terrenos de nuestras comunidades. 

Cabe recordar que el pasado mes de noviembre el INDE firmó un contrato con la empresa brasileña Intertechne Consultores S.A. para realizar estudios de factibilidad para la represa Xalalá, los cuales incluyen los estudios geológicos que deben realizarse en territorio de nuestras comunidades, el cual está programado para el mes de marzo del 2014, y que el lugar que el INDE utilizó a principios de los 80s para la realización de los primeros estudios geológicos del Proyecto Hidroeléctrico Xalalá, se encuentra precisamente en terrenos de la comunidad Xalalá, municipio de Ixcán. 

Ante estos hechos nosotros las comunidades maya q’eqchi’ amenazadas por la construcción de la represa Xalalá, agrupadas en la Asociación ACODET 

M A N I F E S T A M O S 

1. Que en nuestras comunidades todos nos conocemos, usamos la tierra para producir nuestros alimentos, no sabemos, ni aceptamos la presencia o uso de nuestro territorio por parte de grupos del crimen organizado. 
2. Que en Xalalá no existe ninguna pista clandestina. Hay en el centro de la comunidad un área verde que en el pasado se usó como pista de aterrizaje y que actualmente nos sirve como campo de fútbol, espacio comunitario para pastoreo de nuestros animales domésticos y que no está habilitada para aterrizaje de avionetas. 
3. Que el señor Enrique Cajbón es miembro de la autoridad indígena ancestral de la comunidad indígena Q´eqchi’ Xalalá y en ningún momento presentó la supuesta denuncia, como ninguno de los demás miembros de las autoridades de nuestras comunidades fueron informada de dicha denuncia, ni solicitaron protección del ejército. 
4. Que nos resulta muy extraño que el ministerio de gobernación publique por medio de la radio y con anticipación, la realización de un operativo que supuestamente sería para la captura de narcotraficantes. 
5. Que con estos hechos entendemos que el gobierno lo que trata es de atemorizar a nuestras comunidades, desprestigiar nuestra lucha ante la imposición de la represa Xalalá y justificar la presencia de efectivos militares en nuestro territorio. 
6. Que la Declaración de las Naciones Unidas sobre los Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas dice “No se desarrollarán actividades militares en las tierras o territorios de los pueblos indígenas, a menos que lo justifique una amenaza importante para el interés público, o que se hayan acordado libremente con los pueblos indígenas interesados, o que éstos lo hayan solicitado, y que los Estados celebrarán consultas eficaces con los pueblos indígenas interesados, por los procedimientos apropiados y en particular por medio de sus instituciones representativas, antes de utilizar sus tierras o territorios para actividades militares”. (artículo 30). 

Asociación de Comunidades para el Desarrollo y Defensa del Territorio 

A C O D E T 

Playa Grande, Ixcán 28 de febrero 2014 

Pressure to construct Xalalá hydroelectric dam; Local opposition remains strong

The following is a summary of an in-depth report published by ACOGUATE on January 22, 2014 and translated by NISGUA. Read the full report, Pressure to Construct Xalalá Hydroelecrtic Dam; Local Opposition Remains Strong. 

Cultivated fields would be flooded by the Xalalá dam.

Nearly two years after the Guatemalan government announced its renewed interest in constructing the Xalalá Hydroelectric Dam, communities maintain strong opposition to the project in the three affected municipalities: Ixcán, Uspantán, and Cobán. 

The Xalalá Hydroelectric Dam was first proposed in the 1970s. Declared of “national interest,” it figured prominently in the Master Plan for National Electrification and the Northern Transversal Strip (FTN), a political-economic vision for land use, industrialization, and natural resource exploitation. If constructed, the Xalalá Dam would be the second largest hydroelectric dam in the country, producing an estimated 181 megavolts and flooding the lands of some 58 communities in three municipalities.

Community opposition consolidated after the 2007 community consultation held in the municipality of Ixcán, in which more than 90% of the population rejected the construction of hydroelectric dams such as Xalalá. In 2009, the municipality of Uspantán followed suit, holding a community consultation in which 90% of their population also rejected the construction of hydroelectric dams.

Despite the two referenda and strong community opposition to the project, the Xalalá Hydroelectric Dam continued to be a priority both for the Guatemalan government and for companies. Five months after the first referendum in 2007, the State opened bidding for the construction of the Xalalá Dam; one year later the bidding process was closed with no proposals received. 

According to the Association of Communities for Development, Defense of Territory and Natural Resources (ACODET), “No civil servant speaks directly to the damages that communities will suffer; INDE announced the bidding processes as if the communities don't exist. The communities’ position is not to reject something that would bring them benefits - the Xalalá Hydroelectric Dam would flood the best lands and lead to the disappearance of entire communities - it is supporting the right to life and the respect for lands which historically belong to them.”

In 2012, communities reported continued pressures from INDE’s developers, including the offering of development projects conditioned on accepting the dam and other tactics meant to divide the communities; attempts to coopt leaders, inviting them to attend private, all-expense-paid meetings; defamation of local groups and human rights defenders; defamation of information provided by ACODET; continual entrance of unknown persons into the area; helicopter flyovers; and even pressure on the local media, which has favored struggles in defense of territory.

In this context of mounting pressure, on October 18, 2013, INDE's director of project development sent an invitation to community development committees (COCODEs) and social organizations in the area to attend a meeting in Guatemala City "to share experiences with the generation of clean energy”. Instead, communities proposed to carry out this meeting in the Ixcán region and in a format open to the public. On November 13, nineteen INDE representatives arrived in San Juan Chactelá, Ixcán, to present information to some 1,300 leaders and authorities from the affected communities and to hear their position.

This meeting took place after INDE had already signed a contract on November 7 with Brazilian Company Intertechne Constultores S.A. to carry out the geological assessment studies. This information was not shared at the meeting in Chactelá.

The more than 50 communities that would be affected by the construction of the Xalalá Dam continue to express their opposition to the project. The communities  denounce the lack of consultation by INDE and highlight the numerous attempts by communities to obtain more information and communicate their opposition. It was not until November 2013 that INDE even attended a public meeting in the area. The affected communities demand that the State uphold their obligation to assure the right to health, food and a dignified life, and reiterate that these fundamental rights should not be conditioned on accepting the dam.

NISGUA, as part of ACOGUATE, provides human rights accompaniment to  the Association of Communities for Development, Defense of Territory and Natural Resources (ACODET).

Xalalá geological feasibility studies, an emergency contract?

The monitoring committee of the community consultation in the Ixcán writes to the public opinion, social organizations, indigenous organizations and human rights protection organizations with the purpose of informing about the situation created by the plans for the construction of the Xalalá hydro-electric dam. 

Last November 7, the National Electrification Institute (INDE) signed a contract for 12 months with Brazilian company, Intertechne Consultores S.A., to undertake the geological feasibility studies of the Xalalá hydro-electric project. These studies are a preliminary requirement for the project’s construction and an offering from the government before potential investors. The awarding occurred directly, secretly and without transparency. 

The Xalalá project, located at the convergence of the Chixoy and Copón rivers, dates from the 70’s and has been retaken by recent governments, from Berger to Pérez Molina, as it would be the second largest hydroelectric dam in the country. In an article published in Business News Americas – Spanish on July 17, 2012, one finds the following information provided by INDE: “Mid-way through next year there will be a call for bids on the construction of the 180 MW Xalalá hydro-electric project in Guatemala… In accordance with the information coming from INDE, geological studies are being undertaken and the Programming and Planning Secretariat (SEGEPLAN) is working on social matters related to the project, which will require close to US $350 million. The studies will end in February, while the commercial model should be defined between March and April. The latter could determine if INDE will undertake the project without help or through a public-private partnership.” However, the execution of INDE’s plans was not made by the deadline, the new objective is to begin the dam’s construction in 2014.

The invitation to bid on undertaking the “Xalalá Hydro-electric Project Geological, Geotechnical, Seismic and Geophysical Feasibility Study” was published by INDE on December 18, 2012 and was declared null and void on March 5, 2013 for the lack of offers. It is possible that the declared community opposition and nonconformity with some of the conditions weighed on the businesses that bought the terms.     

Facing the bidding failure, the INDE managing council agreed, “to instruct INDE administration that, in accordance with the bidders who showed interest, in agreement with the terms of reference, and who did not participate under obligation by the management of project development, that this is a rapprochement with them without taking on any agreement, with the purpose of understanding the motives of those that did not bid and asking them about the possibility of accepting a direct invitation to present an offer to manage the study of the same project. If viable, the latter join a short list of bidders (3 bidders in agreement with the records associated with the acquisition of the terms of reference); and to define the procedure to follow, with the corresponding judicial opinion. In contrary to this possibility, to propose and recommend the course of action to be able to contract said study, with backing by the appropriate legal dictum.”      

Contracting the company Intertechne Consultores S.A. took place through an emergency purchasing method and was not published in GUATECOMPRAS. According to the new purchases, contract and alienation regulation of INDE, emergency purchases and contracting is possible with the authorization of the general manager. Article 37 of the regulation says: “In emergency situations previously classified by the responsible manager, branches or businesses, the general manager will be able to authorize that urgent purchases or contracts be carried out directly to resolve the related emergency situation. For purchases that do not exceed two million quetzales (2,000,000.00), the general manager must inform the executive council within 15 days that follow; purchases exceeding two million quetzales (2,000,000.00) will require the authorization of the executive council.   

It should be remembered that this new regulation was approved in March 2013, “with the purpose of accelerating the administrative paperwork of INDE's purchasing, contracts and alienation processes and in the interest of having a larger participation in them, it is necessary to adjust and update its standards with the objective of achieving this end and so gaining a better execution”. That is, to increase the conditions’ flexibility, facilitate the contracting procedures and motivate investors. This regulation and the 2013-2027 Energy Policy were presented in the Guatemala Investment Summit forum, which took place in June of this year, as part of the offers presented by the government to promote foreign investment in hydro-electric projects.        

The undertaking of the geological studies requires the presence on the ground of the contracted company’s personnel in five Q’eqchí communities where it is expected that the tunnel and retaining wall will be constructed, making bore holes up to 250 meters deep. Since the start of 2013, INDE personnel maintain strong pressure on communities and their leaders so that they permit the undertaking of the geological studies. A team of 25 developers tries to gain the trust of communities by giving gifts to children, parties, sports uniforms, helicopter trips and offering projects that are not within INDE’s capacity.      

Since the start of 2013, INDE tried to meet with community leaders in Playa Grande, Cobán, and the Guatemala City. The response of the communities was to reject the invitation and ask them to arrive in the region to inform their representatives, since INDE is the party that is interested in the dam’s construction and not the communities. Finally, on November 13, a meeting took place in San Juan Chactelá between said public company and representatives of communities of the Ixcán, Zona Reyna, Uspantán and Cobán that will be directly or indirectly affected by the dam’s construction.  During the meeting, the project manager and other INDE employees explained the institution’s operations, the importance of the Xalalá project and described the geological studies. On their behalf, the communities reiterated the decision expressed in the good faith community consultation and pointed out the distortion of information and the deception on the part of INDE developers. They also made them see the noncompliance of the reparations plan in the areas affected by the Chixoy dam, to whom the damage caused by the construction of the dam has not been repaired, more than 30 years later. A memorial was signed by the attending communities and supported by close to 1,500 attendees where the rejection of the construction of the Xalalá Hydro-electric Plant was reiterated.

On December 4, a meeting took place in the community of Asunción Copón, sponsored by INDE, with representatives of nine communities in the Ixcán microregions III and VI that have been developing the electrification of their communities for 11 years. Marinus Böer, general manager of INDE, and other functionaries of that institution arrived in a helicopter to speak about the comforts of electric energy, the importance of the Xalalá project and the geological study, telling community members that if they don’t accept the Xalalá dam, there will not be sufficient energy for the electrification of the communities. Despite the cooptation or deception of some leaders who lent themselves to the ploy, the position of the majority of community members was to demand electrification, which is a need that is felt in the communities, but they rejected the condition of accepting the Xalalá project, since access to electricity is a right for Guatemalans. On the part of the company, it promised to speed up the electrification project. The development coordinator of INDE repeated that through the electrification projects in the zone, they look to gain the communities’ trust. 

With their lies and biased actions, INDE hopes to confuse public opinion and the communities, and at the same time promote a confrontation between the pro-electric energy committees and the organizations and communities that promote the defense of territory, who are labeled as opponents of development. The lack of electric energy in the rural communities in the north of Huehuetenango, El Quiché and Alta Verapaz, where there is less than 40% coverage, is not due to the lack of generation capacity, but rather the small investment in the rural distribution networks. The 2013 - 2027 Energy Policy, presented by the Ministry of Energy and Mines at the start of this year, notes that, “the current demand of electric power reports values close to 1,500 MW, while the Guatemalan generator park has a production capacity close to 2,700 MW”.  Meanwhile, the demand for 2027 is an estimated 3,000 MW. This surplus allows Guatemala to be the largest Central American exporter of electric energy today. The same government document highlights our country’s great hydro-electric potential and presents the possibilities of increasing the generation capacity and the international market opportunities. The policies and public and private investment have prioritized electric interconnection for large consumers, which is to say the urban and industrial centers and exportation through the Central American Electrical Interconnection System (SIEPAC).    

In light of the mentioned facts, the organizations and communities that form the Ixcán community consultation monitoring committee affirm that undertaking the "Xalalá Hydro-electric Project Geologic, Geotechnical, Seismic and Geophysical Feasibility Study" as contracted by INDE does not have the free, prior and informed consent of the communities where it is claimed that the study will take place and overlooks the results of the community consultations undertaken in the Ixcán (2007) and Uspantán (2009) municipalities. The imposition of government plans for the construction of mega-projects, without considering the decision and rights of the indigenous communities that will be affected could cause conflicts and confrontations, such as are occurring in Barillas and San Mateo Ixtatán (Department of Huehuetenango) and Monte Olivo, municipality of Cobán.

The strategy of making a condition of development projects, to mislead and divide communities is also a violation of the rights of indigenous people to information, to freely decide their development priorities, to a free, prior, and informed consultation and to non-discrimination.  One would have to ask the INDE executives: How much has this institution spent in social studies and paying consultants who direct the “social work” of promoting the Xalalá project? How much has it cost the Guatemalan people to sustain a large team of developers, the vehicles, the constant helicopter flights, the parties and the gifts to win the trust of the communities? Why not invest this money in compensating the communities affected by the Chixoy dam? Why believe that they can continue changing indigenous people's gold for glass beads? They have forgotten that we are neither in the times of the conquest, nor of Ubico, nor in the 80’s when our communities were massacred with impunity.

Playa Grande, Ixcán, December 9, 2013

1 http://content.yudu.com/Library/A2kzvp/IntertechneNoticias4/resources/index.htm?referrerUrl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.intertechne.com.br%2Fesp%2Findex.php%3Foption%3Dcom_content%26task%3Dview%26id%3D352%26Itemid%3D2
2 http://cmiguate.org/secretamente-inde-otorga-proyecto-de-xalala-a-empresa-brasilena/
3 CDR-084-2013. AJP-314-178-2013 OAI-110-79-2013 A-13-2013-4 Guatemala, 9 April 2013.
4 Reglamento de compras, contrataciones y enajenaciones del instituto nacional de electrificación, approved in session of 5 March 2013 by the Directive Council of INDE, act number 9-2013.
5 Idem
6 “Acuerdo Política entre el Gobierno de la República de Guatemala y los representantes de las Comunidades afectadas por la construcción de la hidroeléctrica Chixoy”, signed 10 July 2009 by the President of the Republic, Representative of COCAICH, the mediator of the OAS.
7 Ministry of Energy and Mines. Energy Policy 2013-2027, page 22.

Estudios de factibilidad geológica Xalalá, ¿Una contratación de emergencia?

La Comisión de Seguimiento a la Consulta Comunitaria en Ixcán se dirige a la opinión pública, organizaciones sociales, organizaciones indígenas y organismos de protección a los derechos humanos con el fin de informar sobre la situación generada por los planes para la construcción de la hidroeléctrica Xalalá.

El 7 de noviembre pasado el INDE firmó un contrato por 12 meses, para realizar los estudios de factibilidad geológica del Proyecto hidroeléctrico Xalalá a la empresa brasileña Intertechne Consultores S.A.1 hidroeléctrico y un ofrecimiento del gobierno ante posibles inversionistas. La adjudicación se realizó de manera directa, secreta y sin transparencia.

El proyecto Xalalá, ubicado en la confluencia de los ríos Chixoy y Copón, data de los años 70s y ha sido retomado por los gobiernos recientes, desde Berger hasta Pérez Molina, pues sería la segunda hidroeléctrica más grande del país. En un artículo publicado en el Business News Américas – Spanish del 17 de julio de 2,012 se encuentra la siguiente información proporcionada por el INDE: “A mediados del próximo año se realizaría una convocatoria para la licitación de la construcción de la hidroeléctrica de 180MW Xalalá en Guatemala… De acuerdo con información proveniente del INDE, se están realizando estudios geológicos y la Secretaría de Planificación y Programación (SEGEPLAN) está trabajando en los temas sociales relacionados con el proyecto, que requerirá cerca de U$350 millones. Los estudios concluirán en febrero, mientras que el modelo comercial debe definirse entre  marzo y abril. Este último podría determinar que el INDE realizará el proyecto sin ayuda o mediante una sociedad público-privada.” Pero la ejecución de los planes del INDE no se hizo en los tiempos previstos, la nueva meta es iniciar la construcción de la represa en el 2014.

La invitación a ofertar para la realización del “Estudio de Factibilidad Geológica, Geotécnica, Sísmica y Geofísica del Proyecto Hidroeléctrico Xalalá” fue publicada por el INDE el 18 de diciembre del 2012 y declarado desierto el 5 de marzo del 2013 por falta de oferentes. Muy posiblemente en la decisión de las empresas que compraron las bases pesó la manifiesta oposición comunitaria y la inconformidad con algunas de las condiciones.2 del INDE acordó “Instruir a la Administración del INDE que, de acuerdo con los Oferentes que manifestaron interés, adquiriendo los Términos de Referencia y que no participaron, por parte de la Gerencia de Desarrollo de Proyectos se tenga un acercamiento con los mismos sin asumir compromiso alguno, a efecto de conocer los motivos por los que no ofertaron y consultarles la posibilidad de aceptar una invitación directa para presentar oferta dirigida al mismo Estudio. De ser viable lo anterior integrar una Lista Corta de Oferentes (3 Oferentes de acuerdo a los antecedentes relacionados con la adquisición de Términos de Referencia); y, definir el procedimiento a seguir, con la opinión jurídica correspondiente. En contrario de esa posibilidad, proponer y recomendar el curso de acción para poder contratar dicho Estudio, con respaldo del Dictamen Legal que corresponda.”3

La contratación de la empresa Intertechne Consultores S.A. se realizó a través de la modalidad de compras de emergencia, y no fue publicada en GUATECOMPRAS, ya que según el nuevo Reglamento de Compras, Contrataciones y Enajenaciones del INDE, es posible la realización de compras y contrataciones de emergencia con la autorización del Gerente General. El artículo 37 del Dichos estudios son un requisito previo para la construcción del proyecto. Ante el fracaso de la licitación, el Consejo Directivo reglamento dice: “En situaciones de emergencia previamente calificadas por la Gerencia, Dependencias o Empresas que corresponda, el Gerente General podrá autorizar, que se efectúen compras o contrataciones urgentes en forma directa para resolver la situación de emergencia de que se trate. Adquisiciones cuyo monto no sea superior a dos millones de quetzales (2,000,000.00) la Gerencia General deberá informar dentro de los 15 días siguientes al Consejo Directivo; Adquisiciones superiores a dos millones de quetzales (2,000,000.00) requerirá autorización del Consejo Directivo.4

Cabe recordar que este nuevo reglamento fue aprobado en marzo del 2013 “Con el fin de agilizar la gestión administrativa de los procesos de compra, contrataciones y enajenaciones del INDE, y en aras de contar con una mayor participación en los mismos se hace necesario adecuar y actualizar sus normas con el objeto de lograr ese fin y así obtener una mejor ejecución”5 las condiciones, facilitar los procedimientos de contratación y motivar a los inversionistas. Éste reglamento y la Política Energética 2013 - 2027, fue presentado en el foro Guatemala Investment Summit, que se llevó a cabo en junio de este año, como parte de las ofertas presentadas por el gobierno para promover la inversión extranjera en hidroeléctricas.

La realización de los estudios geológicos requiere la presencia en el terreno del personal de la empresa contratada en cinco comunidades q’eqchí donde se pretende construir el túnel y la cortina, realizando perforaciones de hasta 250 metros de profundidad. Desde principios del 2013 personal del INDE mantiene una fuerte presión sobre líderes y comunidades para que permitan la realización de los estudios geológicos. Un equipo de unos 25 promotores intenta ganarse la confianza de las comunidades mediante la entrega de regalos a los niños, fiestas, uniformes deportivos, paseos en helicóptero y ofrecimientos de proyectos que no son de la competencia del INDE.

Desde principios del 2013 el INDE había intentado reunirse con líderes comunitarios en Playa Grande, Cobán y la ciudad capital. La respuesta de las comunidades fue rechazar la invitación y pedirles llegar hasta la región para informar a sus representantes, ya que el interesado en la construcción de la represa es el INDE, no las comunidades. Finalmente, el 13 de noviembre se realizó en San Juan Chactelá una reunión entre dicha empresa pública y representantes de comunidades de Ixcán, Zona Reyna, Uspantán y Cobán que serán afectadas directas o indirectas por la construcción de la represa. Durante la reunión el Gerente de Proyectos y otros empleados del INDE expusieron el qué hacer de esa institución, la importancia del proyecto Xalalá y describieron los estudios geológicos. Por su parte los comunitarios reiteraron la decisión expresada en la Consulta Comunitaria de Buena Fe y señalaron la tergiversación de la información y engaño por parte de los promotores del INDE. Se les hizo ver también el incumplimiento del plan de resarcimiento a los afectados por la represa Chixoy6 a quienes no se les ha reparado el daño a más de 30 años de haberse construido la represa. Se entregó en esa ocasión un memorial firmado por las comunidades asistentes y avalado por las cerca de 1,500 personas asistentes donde se reitera el rechazo a la construcción de la Hidroeléctrica Xalalá.

El día 04 de diciembre se realizó en la comunidad Asunción Copón, Ixcán, una reunión promovida por el INDE, con representantes de nueve comunidades de las microrregiones III y VI de Ixcán, que han estado gestionando desde hace once años la electrificación de sus comunidades. Marinus Böer, Gerente General del INDE y otros funcionarios de esa institución que llegaron en helicóptero, para hablar sobre las bondades de la energía eléctrica, la importancia del proyecto Xalalá y el estudio geológico, diciendo a los comunitarios que si no aceptan la represa Xalalá no habrá energía suficiente  para la electrificación de las comunidades. A pesar de la cooptación o engaño de algunos líderes que se prestaron a la maniobra, la postura de la mayoría de los comunitarios fue demandar la electrificación, que es una necesidad sentida de las comunidades, pero rechazaron la condición de aceptar el Proyecto Xalalá, ya que el acceso a la electricidad es un derecho como guatemaltecos. Por su parte la empresa se comprometió a agilizar el proyecto de electrificación. El coordinador de los promotores del INDE reiteró que mediante los proyectos de electrificación en la zona, buscan ganar la confianza de las comunidades.

Con sus mentiras y acciones tendenciosas el INDE pretende confundir a la opinión pública, a las comunidades, y al mismo tiempo promover la confrontación entre los comités pro-energía eléctrica y las organizaciones y comunidades que promueven la defensa del territorio, a quienes señala de opositores al desarrollo. La falta de energía eléctrica en las comunidades rurales del norte de Huehuetenango, El Quiché y Alta Verapaz, donde hay una cobertura menor al 40%, no se debe a la falta de capacidad de generación, sino a la poca inversión en las redes de distribución rural. La Política Energética 2013 – 2027, presentada por el Ministerio de Energía y Minas a principios de este año, señala que “la demanda actual de potencia eléctrica reporta valores cercanos a los 1,500 MW, mientras que el parque generador guatemalteco posee una capacidad instalada cercana a los 2,700 MW”7. Mientras que la demanda para el año 2027 se estima en 3,000 MW. Esa sobreoferta permite que Guatemala sea hoy día el primer exportador de energía eléctrica de Centroamérica. El mismo documento gubernamental destaca el gran potencial hídrico de nuestro país y plantea las posibilidades de aumentar la capacidad de generación y las oportunidades del mercado internacional. Las políticas e inversión de pública y privada ha priorizado la interconexión eléctrica hacia los grandes consumidores, es decir los centros urbanos e industriales y la exportación a través del sistema de interconexión eléctrica de Centroamérica SIEPAC.

Ante los hechos mencionados, las organizaciones y comunidades integrantes de la Comisión de Seguimiento a la Consulta Comunitaria en Ixcán, afirmamos que la realización del Estudio de Factibilidad Geológica, Geotécnica, Sísmica y Geofísica del Proyecto Hidroeléctrico Xalalá contratado por el INDE, no cuenta con el consentimiento libre, previo e informado de las comunidades donde se pretende realizar el estudio, y pasa por alto los resultados de las consultas comunitarias realizadas en el municipio de Ixcán (2007) y Uspantán (2009). La imposición de los planes gubernamentales para la construcción de megaproyectos, sin considerar la decisión y los derechos de las comunidades indígenas que serán afectadas, podrían causar conflictos y enfrentamientos, como está ocurriendo en Barillas, y San Mateo Ixtatán (Departamento de Huehuetenango) y Monte Olivo, municipio de Cobán.

La estrategia de condicionar los proyectos de desarrollo, engañar y dividir a las comunidades es también una violación a los derechos de los pueblos indígenas a la información, a decidir libremente sus prioridades de desarrollo, a la consulta libre previa e informada, a la no discriminación. Habría que preguntar a los directivos del INDE ¿cuánto ha gastado esta institución en estudios sociales y pago de consultores que dirigen el “trabajo social” de promoción del proyecto Xalalá? ¿Cuánto le cuesta al pueblo de Guatemala sostener un numeroso equipo de promotores, los vehículos, los constantes vuelos de helicóptero, las fiestas y los regalos para ganarse la confianza de las comunidades? ¿Por qué no invierten ese dinero en resarcir a las comunidades afectadas por la represa Chixoy? ¿Por qué creen que a los pueblos indígenas nos pueden seguir cambiando oro por cuentas de vidrio? Se olvidan los que ya no estamos en los tiempos de la conquista, ni de Ubico, ni en los años 80, cuando fueron masacradas impunemente nuestras comunidades.

Playa Grande, Ixcán, 09 de diciembre de 2013

1 http://content.yudu.com/Library/A2kzvp/IntertechneNoticias4/resources/index.htm?referrerUrl=htt%3A%2%2Fwww.intertechne.com.br%2Fesp%2Findex.php%3Foption%3Dcom_content%26task%3Dview%26id%3D352%26Itemid%3D2
2 http://cmiguate.org/secretamente-inde-otorga-proyecto-de-xalala-a-empresa-brasilena/
3 CDR-084-2013. AJP-314-178-2013 OAI-110-79-2013 A-13-2013-4 Guatemala, 9 de abril 2013.
4 Reglamento de compras, contrataciones y enajenaciones del instituto nacional de electrificación, aprobado en sesión del 5 de marzo de 2013 por el Consejo Directivo del INDE, acta número 9-2013.
5 Idem
6 “Acuerdo Política entre el Gobierno de la República de Guatemala y los representantes de las Comunidades afectadas por la construcción de la hidroeléctrica Chixoy”, suscrito el 1º de julio de 2009 por el Presidente de la República, Representante de COCAICH y el mediador de la OEA.
7 Ministerio de Energía y Minas. Política Energética 2013-2027, página 22.

Genocide on Trial, Day 12: Beatriz Manz, author of "Paradise in Ashes"

NISGUA continues live coverage of the trial in Guatemala of Efraín Rios Montt and Mauricio Rodriguez Sánchez for genocide and crimes against humanity.

Read our previous summaries: Day 1, Day 2, Day 3, Day 4/5, Day 6, Day 7, Day 8, Day 9, Day 10 and full archive of ongoing live Twitter coverage.

Here we share the rush transcript of Beatriz Manz's testimony from day 12. Beatriz Manz is professor in anthropology at the University of California, Berkeley and the author of Paradise in Ashes, a truly moving account of the history of the Ixcán community, Santa María Tzejá. NISGUA currently provides international human rights accompaniment to Santa María Tzejá and has maintained a relationship with the community since the international accompaniment of returned refugees in the mid 1990s. The Needham Congregational Church of Massachusetts, a NISGUA sponsoring community, has partnered with Santa María Tzejá since 1987.

On day 12, 10 forensic expert witnesses testified before Manz closed the day. Stay tuned for our multi-day summary of the forensic experts' participation in the trial!

Ríos Montt & defense lawyer Francisco Palomo listen to Beatriz Manz. Photo: Roderico Yool

Public Prosecutor: Did you come to Guatemala in the 1980s? What did you do?
I first came to Guatemala in 1973 as a student of the State University of New York. I came to do my doctoral thesis research in Santa Cruz del Quiché. Later, my investigation focus changed. Based on questions asked by villages in Santa Cruz del Quiché, I went to the southern coast and Ixcán. 



In 1981, I went to Mexico because I found out that 2,000 refugees had fled from Guatemalan military repression. I went to the cooperatives on the shores of the Usumacinta River and the Arbolito River to see what was happening. In 1982, I went to the Lacandon jungle to visit refugee camps, like camp Puerto Rico, to interview people and see what was happening, why people were leaving Guatemala on a massive scale. In 1982, the number of refugees had grown to 36,000 and there were already 46 refugee camps. 



The United Nations opened an office to deal with the huge quantity of people coming to the Lacandon jungle. The Mexican Commission for Aid to Refugees (COMAR) was also opened to address the huge necessity of refugees fleeing from massacres in Guatemala. The refugees arrived in bad conditions and malnourished from living in the jungle and they decided to cross the border into Mexico because of hunger. Some arrived hurt with gunshot wounds.



Talking to refugees in the Lacandon Jungle, I found out about an even more critical situation in the Ixil region. More critical because the situation was more advanced in the Ixil region. They indicated that people couldn’t flee as refugees because of the distance [from the border] and the level of repression. In 1983, I went to the Ixil region; I went to Nebaj, Chajul. At each stage of the journey, I noticed the changes that Quiché had undergone; I noticed the large quantity of soldiers and military controls. Traveling through Chichicastenango, Santa Cruz del Quiché, Sacapulas and then arriving in the Ixil region, I observed a greatly increased military presence.

In Mexico, you found out where people had come from?
In 1982, as I said, there were 36,000 refugees mostly from the Ixcán and Huehuetenango. Aside from 36,000 in 1982, there were thousands of Guatemalans who had fled from the military that were not in refugee camps. In 1983, according to COMAR and the United Nation's Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (OACNUDH), there were 850,000 confirmed as Guatemalan refugees, dispersed throughout the world. As you know they went as far as the United States where there are more than 1 million Guatemalans today

Were there Ixiles?
Yes, but few. It was difficult for the Ixiles to arrive because of distance and difficult of finding ways out… According to a census conducted by COMAR on languages spoken by refugees, less than 1000 were Ixiles.

Doctor, why did you go to the Ixil region?
I heard in interviews in the Lacandon Jungle that the situation was critical in the Ixil region. I went to see if it was true.

During your visit, you interviewed a member of military?
I spoke with many soldiers and also an officer in Nebaj.

Could you determine, when you arrived in the Ixil region, if there were refugee centers?
Yes. I don’t know if they called them pre-model villages but there were places where they put the displaced who had been brought down from the mountains.

Can you describe the conditions the people lived in the pre-model villages?
It was a difficult situation. The people arrived in poor health; they didn’t know what their future held or how long would be there. Conditions were difficult physically and mentally. There was anxiety, fear and worry about the situation they were in and an uncertain future. In the case of the men, they were forced to take turns in the civil defense patrols (PAC) and had to do forced labor, like building roads. One could see... unfortunate I can’t show you a photo but I will try to describe what could be explained better visually [in a photo].... The people were practically moving mountains, opening roadways or patrolling in the rain, covered only with a piece of plastic. They were in a precarious situation. Very hard demands made on the population.

How long were you in the Ixil region?
I was there for approximately a week in March 1983.

Did you interview refugees?
Yes, that was the purpose of my trip to the Ixil region. I spoke with as many people possible to determine if they were from there, what had happened to their communities and their crops, when they were displaced, who brought them there. I didn't ask intense questions but I tried to determine who the people were and who had brought them to the pre-model village.

What was the attitude or behavior of the people?
Understandably, when a strange person arrives it causes apprehension, and that made it difficult to conduct interviews. So I limited my questions to focus on determining why they were there.

Did they respond with fear?
Yes, I would say it was difficult for them to respond. It was obvious that there was certain vocabulary they didn’t want to use. For example, it was hard for them to speak about the army or guerrillas. So, a typical interview might be: "How long are you here? 4 months. How did you get here? They brought us. We were in the mountains. Who brought you? They brought us." It was difficult for them….

I have read many documents, as any academic would. In military docs for example Juan Fernando Cifuentes identified the unique relationship that Ixil people had with the military and that it had to be changed. Later, I read declassified documents from the CIA, from the US embassy and the US State Department. I read one in particular in which the CIA says that according to them, it was obvious the military had determined the Ixil population to be sympathizers to the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres, EGP). This created a problem because it meant that the military could be expected to act in the same way toward the civil population as the combatant population.

Doctor, do you remember the specific places where you visited and interviewed people?
In Nebaj, Chajul and of course on the road, whenever I had the opportunity to interview someone, I would.

Those centers where you interviewed refugees, were they near a military base?
There were so many soldiers it was unavoidable. There was a center for refugees in Nebaj and I remember a place called La Pista where there were control posts. The military was present. They had an enormous presence, difficult to number but I would say there were hundreds of solider around Nebaj and Chajul.

How did you communicate, in Spanish or with an interpreter?
I spoke with those who could speak Spanish. If someone couldn’t speak Spanish, I asked if someone could translate for me.

Can the acts you were analyzing and investigating be interpreted as isolated or as systematic?
Based on all the testimonies I collected in Mexico, and the military campaigns in the Ixil region and Huehuetenango, it was obvious that there were patterns. I never had the impression that a massacre or destruction of a village or crops was something spontaneously done by the military. The similarities were such that there were certain evident patterns.

When you arrived in the Ixil region, did you interview any guerrilla?
No.

When you were in pre-model villages, or refugee centers, did you witness psychological impacts?
Yes, they called populations to meetings, held a sort of class in which they taught populations they couldn’t be used or manipulated by the EGP. No, in fact, they didn’t say EGP, they said "delinquents", "subversives", "terrorists" and that there were white foreigners who wanted to take over the country. They said that the country was big and they couldn’t protect the whole country from these forces that were trying to take over the country so everyone had to help out in PACs, the work had to be forced in exchange for food. The purpose was to convince the population to ally with the military and not be manipulated by insurgents.

What did you do with the information you collected?
I wrote in publications for Cultural Survival and Harvard, or in magazines, I wrote for the New York Times editorial page. I also submitted information to Americas Watch and I was asked to give testimony before Congress in Washington DC.

According to interviews and the information you analyzed, were you able to tell who executed the massacres of families?
Yes, they said military had entered to execute massacres. Once displaced in mountains or in the jungle, the military continued to pursue them. They cut down their crops, and destroyed any type of food they had. For that reason, the families suffered greatly. They came to a moment they never before imagined; they were forced to leave their own country. They were in hiding for a long time but realized that the military was occupying more and more territory and it would be impossible to return. They also realized that there was nothing to return to - no community, no church, no school, nothing. 

In the Ixcán, this was very hard. I originally went there to see how farmers from the highlands were colonizing the land. The people had cleared the land there with their own hands and arms. They had called it Paradise, the Promised Land…. and everything they had built, all their hard work was destroyed in 24 hrs, in one day. It was psychologically devastating to see everything destroyed...to arrive at [refugee] camps in Mexico. They had lost their ability to work in their own fields, everything was destroyed. They had to walk for weeks from Guatemala to Mexico, that’s why they arrived to Mexico so hurt. What had been done to their country was something unforgivable.

As you can see in this photo [referring to submitted evidence], people arrived barefoot with no clothes. A group of refugees in camp Puerto Rico arrived, there were hundreds or people already there. There, they found two children nude who were so traumatized they couldn’t say where their parents were or what had happened or why they were naked. They arrived in bad conditions. Six women from Santa María Tzejá gave birth in the jungle. One lost her son, the other five were able to arrive with their babies but they were in very bad condition, with eye infections and malnourished. They were in terrible human condition

Were there also elderly?
Oh yes, there is a photo of a person who could barely walk but the hope of crossing the border encouraged them to arrive. Some were lost on the road; others arrived to the camps with gun wounds.

Can you explain the relocation of refugee camps? Were they close or far from the border?
In 1984 the Mexican government decided to relocate the Guatemalan population near the border. They brought them to Campeche and Quintana Roo, partly because, according to the interviews I conducted in Mexico, the Mexican government was worried about the Guatemala military entering Mexican territory. The Guatemalan military entered into the refugee camps and killed people on Mexican territory. The Mexican government had two options: either invade Guatemala or put troops on the border, which they didn’t want to do. However, they wanted to protect their country's sovereignty so they decided to move the refugees. I followed the path of the relocation from the Lacandon Jungle to Campeche and Quintana Roo. Some Guatemala refugees refused to be relocated. I crossed the river from Camp Puerto Rico to visit them and asked them why. They told me they refused to leave their country.

Did you compare the Ixil and Ixcán regions?
Yes, this was always important to my methodology as an anthropologist. For the sake of comparison, I visited cotton, sugar and coffee plantations; I interviewed workers who came from the cold highlands and also plantation owners. That’s why I went to the Ixcán, to understand Santa Cruz del Quiché. I went to Zacapa, the Verapaces, Chimaltenango and Xela. I visited many communities to try to understand the situation.

Did you ever see anti-subversive propaganda?
Yes, I saw pamphlets. I have a collection that features drawings showing a terrorist with a tail and an ugly demented face. One pamphlet shows what the military did, drawings of burned houses, killed people, kidnapped children, and total destruction... evil things. I saw different pamphlets, yes.

Prosecution lawyer Pérez: Did you ask for permission to travel in 1983?
Yes. I went to a military building in Zone 1 [of Guatemala City] where I obtained permission to travel to the interior of country.

When traveling from Guatemala City to the Ixil region in March 1983, did you see any buses or cars that were stopped and had passengers taken out?
There were many checkpoints; in some there were troops watching and taking names in notebooks, asking people to show their documents. This occurred during the whole trip there and back. If one travelled by bus, the military would ask everyone to get out and identify themselves.

During this trip, did you see the same in Nebaj or Chajul?
Yes, military checkpoints were there too.

Did you see if any other Guatemalans could arrive freely in that region?
It depended on the situation. For example, there were people from churches. In the case of evangelical pastor Ray Elliot who came with others from the Unite States, Efraín Ríos Montt provided them with a helicopter and ordered that they be brought in by helicopter. Certain people didn’t need the kind of permission I needed.

My previous question wasn't referring to foreigners, were there any Guatemalan journalists or academics able to travel to the region?
No, I didn’t see any.

Prosecution lawyer Vivar: When you mentioned interviewing people in the Ixil region, in Nebaj and Chajul, did you interview women?
Yes, in the community. On the road I interviewed men.

Do you remember if women spoke of sexual violence?
No, I didn’t ask them.

You spoke of conditions of refugees. Once you arrived in the refugee camps, what were the conditions in Mexico?
There was such a multitude of living conditions. It was difficult for COMAR or OACNUDH to deal with so many people. The refugees grew to 46,000 people, living in isolated places like the Lacandon Jungle. I had to arrive by canoe or by foot. It was difficult at first until the camps could be established, which Mexico helped achieve. They took care of providing schooling and health services but it was difficult to get to the places, made even more difficult by the huge quantity of people arriving.

When you visited the Ixil pre-model village, did you see international aid arrive?
The majority of aid that arrived came from the international community. Food was distributed by the military. I never heard them say it was from the international community, they just distributed it. I know there were sad conditions that moved the international community to send food or materials for building houses. The aid shouldn’t have been dist by the military, but by NGOs. However, the churches and military distributed it, creating a dependency on these institutions - the military and church.

Can you explain, in regards to the refugee children, whether orphans arrived?
Yes, in some cases orphans arrived. You can’t imagine the situation. I found people in the refugee camps. There was a father who had grabbed his daughter and went running as soon as the shooting began. He protected her and didn’t know for many years what happened to his wife and other children. It wasn’t until I arrived at the refugee camps that I was able to tell his wife and daughter that he had been able to cross the border. In Mexico, I was able to explain to him that his wife and his daughter had also survived.

Another example, the military arrived where a family was hidden and. The military's arrival was unexpected and they came upon the family very suddenly; each of them ran in different directions. When the parents looked for their children, to see whether they were dead or not, they realized they were gone. They searched and searched for them. After many years they found out the children had been taken to Playa Grande and Nebaj. One child ended up in Huehuetenango and another in the capital.

I also want to say that there were newspapers publications about children; one said there were dozens of orphans in the country. It didn't surprise me in the least.

Did you find out if there were people who died in the refugee camps in Mexico?
For example, in camp Puerto Rico, there were graves. I brought photos that show where Guatemala refugees were buried.

Defense lawyer Palomo: When you went to the Ixil region in 1983, you said you were undertaking your doctoral thesis?
No, that was in 1973…

Did you go to the Ixil region out of professional or for personal interest?
I went with the professional interest of wanting to document what was happening.

To write a book?
Yes, exactly

Did you work for an organization in 1983?
I was a professor at Wellesley College and an investigator for Harvard University.

In 1983, were you financed by Harvard?
The Ford Foundation gave me financing, and the University also. There were different ways to obtain funding for these trips.

You told us when you interviewed people in Ixil region, it was difficult because some topics were hard to talk about, for example, the military and the guerrilla. Were they afraid of both groups?
I got that impression mostly from interviews and conversations. When the military called a meeting, they never referred to the EGP by their name nor as guerrillas, they called them "subversives" or "delinquents". In interviews, many people would tell me, "'the military" had brought me" but they gave me the impression they shouldn’t use certain words because they were too politically strong.

Do you remember the name of the officer you spoke to?
No.

You told us the population fled to the mountains and that those who could went to Mexico. Did you know who took these people to refugee camps?
There were different people who took them. For example, a community leader or a teacher, a person who knew the road would show the way. It could be someone who had demonstrated their leadership in the community like a health promoter or teacher.

Did you see the massacres by the military or did other people tell you?
Objection. Accepted.

Defense lawyer Cornejo: You told us you came to Guatemala and went to the Ixil region for one week in March 1983. After that week, where did you go?
To the United States.

Did you stay in the United States or did you return to Guatemala?
I returned in 1985.

You told us that in 1982 you had been on the Mexican border and that Guatemalan refugees crossed the border. My question is, did you see only Ladinos or other ethnicities?
Other ethnicities.

This is more of an academic question and if you don't know you don't have to answer. Do you know in what month the model villages were created in 1983?
I understand that there were different names. Some villages, like La Violeta, apparently weren’t considered model villages, maybe pre-model villages, or displaced villages. La Violeta wasn’t really a village because it was a disaster. I'm sure it wasn't until 1984 or 1985 that the military named them and said, "This is a model village."

Any errors in transcription or translation are our own.

For more #GenocideGT expert witness testimonies in their entirety, listen to Marta Casaús Arzú's testimony from day 10 here.